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NOTES
ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY COERCED
BY A UNIVERSITY
In Furutani v. Ewigleben1 five students at the College of San
Mateo, a California state junior college, were charged with unlawful
conduct during a campus demonstration and were suspended pending
determination of the charges. Subsequently, criminal charges based
upon the same acts were brought against the students in the state courts.
Since the college disciplinary proceedings were to be conducted prior
to the criminal trials, the students moved for injunctive relief in the
form of an order postponing the college proceedings until the trials
had been completed. They argued that they might be forced to testify
at the college hearings under threat of expulsion, and that the testi-
mony so obtained would then be introduced in the criminal trials in
violation of their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2
Students' fears in this regard are well-founded. For example, if a
student were forced to admit to a college disciplinary board that he
had carried an unregistered firearm during a demonstration, and if
this evidence were admissible in a criminal trial, the prosecutor would
have only to call the members of the disciplinary board in order to
assure a conviction.
Whether testimony given under threat of expulsion is admissible
in a criminal trial must be considered in two contexts. Students in
public universities are protected by the fourteenth amendment.3 Stu-
1 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
2 Id. at 1164-65. The court denied the motion for an injunction, stating that the
students could invoke Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), to exclude such testimony
from a criminal trial. For a discussion of Garrity see note 7 infra.
3 The federal courts are unanimous in finding state action in the activities of public
universities: Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968) (regulation of discipline by
Dean of Students in New York State College of Ceramics held to constitute state action);
Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968) (due process requirements
satisfied where students given opportunity to make defense and to have such a hearing
as would do justice by both the students and the university); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961) (due process held to require notice and some
opportunity for hearing before students at Alabama State College could be expelled for
misconduct); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D.
Mo. 1967) (due process held to require that in a disciplinary hearing students be permitted
to have the assistance of counsel, be furnished with written charges, have the right to be
heard, and have the right to cross-examine); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp.
396, 402 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (disciplinary procedures that gave students notice, explanation
of charges, and an opportunity to be heard held consistent with due process requirements).
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dents in private universities4 are not adequately protected by the state
action approach, but a more fundamental principle may bar admission
of their coerced statements.
I
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY
A. Coercion in Non-Criminal Proceedings
The protection granted by the fifth amendment is "the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence." 5
The term "penalty" is not restricted to imprisonment or fine, but in-
cludes any sanction that makes the assertion of the privilege "costly."6
Thus threats of job forfeiture7 and of disbarment s have been held un-
constitutional forms of compulsion. The threat of expulsion from a
college or university is also a powerful form of compulsion. As the
Fifth Circuit said, "no one can question that the right to remain at the
college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing is an in-
terest of extremely great value."9
4 For the distinction between public and private universities, see pages 437-38 infra.
5 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
6 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967), quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614 (1965).
7 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Police officers under investigation for
alleged fixing of traffic tickets were informed of their right to remain silent but were
warned that they would be subject to dismissal if they did. The officers answered the
questions put to them. Over the officers' objections, the answers were then used to convict
them of conspiring to obstruct the administration of the traffic laws. The Supreme Court
reversed the convictions, holding that the choice between job forfeiture and self-incrimina-
tion was an unconstitutional form of compulsion.
8 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). In this case, the Court stated that the privilege
against self-incrimination is to be widely applied. It pointed out that the privilege had
always been given a "liberal construction" and added that there was "no room in the
privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some
and extend it to others." Id. at 516.
9 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961). Although the
court was concerned with a public institution, the considerations it deemed important (the
difficulty that a student expelled from one university would have completing his education
at that or any other university, and the consequences that this would have for his later
life) are equally applicable to private universities. In Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), the court took notice that
in the present day, expulsion from an institution of higher learning, or suspension
for a period of time substantial enough to prevent one from obtaining academic
credit for a particular term, may well be, and often is in fact, a more severe
sanction than a monetary fine or a relatively brief confinement imposed by a court
in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 988
COERCED TESTIMONY
Coercion of testimony in a non-criminal proceeding has been held
a violation of the fifth amendment privilege where the testimony so
obtained might be damaging in a subsequent criminal action. 0 In Blau
v. United States" appellant, a witness before a federal grand jury,
was held in contempt following her refusal to answer certain questions
concerning the Communist Party of Colorado. Reversing the convic-
tion, the Supreme Court held that it was immaterial whether the an-
swers to these questions would, by themselves, have supported a crimi-
nal conviction under the Smith Act. The important consideration was
that the admissions "would have furnished a link in the chain of evi-
dence needed in a prosecution ... '.12 Thus it is not necessary that
the person claiming the fifth amendment privilege be under indictment
or even be asked questions which, if answered, would be sufficient to
sustain a conviction; the only requirement is that the answers could
be part of the evidence against the person being questioned in a subse-
quent criminal action.
B. The Requirement of State Action
It is well established that the fourteenth amendment-the link
between the fifth amendment and the states' 3-applies to tax-supported
state colleges and universities. 4 These institutions have their origin
in the legislature and are supported by taxes and controlled by the
state.15 This control, which is often exercised by a board of regents
elected by the voters of the state, extends to every facet of university
activity.16 Campus disorders are not limited to public institutions, how-
ever, and it is thus important to consider whether the state action con-
cept'applies to private universities. Since these institutions are generally
10 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (administrative hearing);
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (legislative investigation); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (legislative investigation); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367
(1951) (grand jury); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) (grand jury). See also the
recent Supreme Court rulings that prosecutions under various registration and tax statutes
are barred when compliance with the statute would subject the defendant to the risk of
self-incrimination: Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (marijuana tax and registra-
tion statute); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (firearms taxation and registra-
tion statute); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (wagering excise tax statute);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (wagering tax and registration statute).
11 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
12 Id. at 161.
13 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
14 Note 3 supra.
15 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1969).
16 See, e.g., id. §§ 353-55(a).
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not controlled and supported wholly by the state,'7 a finding of state
action must rest on other factors.
There are three principal arguments for the contention that state
action is present in the activities of private educational institutions:
governments regulate standards of education even in private univer-
sities; private universities have direct financial and other ties with
government; and education is a public function, making the admin-
istrators of all universities subject to the fourteenth amendment.
1. Regulation of Education Standards
Whether government regulation of educational standards makes
acts of the school acts of the state was considered recently by the Second
Circuit in Powe v. Miles.'8 There, four Alfred University students
participated in a demonstration on the football field during a ROTC
ceremony.19 Having refused to obey an order by the Dean of Students
to cease their activities, the students were suspended for two semesters. 20
The students then brought an action in federal district court. Alleging
violations of the Civil Rights Act, they invoked the court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)21 and demanded temporary and final in-
junctions compelling the University to reinstate them.
17 See, e.g., the Bylaws and 1967-68 financial report of Cornell University. In the fiscal
year covered, public appropriation constituted only 6/10 of 1% of the total income for the
privately endowed colleges. In addition, of the 39 voting members of the Board of Trustees,
only five are appointed by the state. For a general discussion of the legal distinctions
between public and private universities, see 15 Am. JUR. 2d Colleges & Universities
§§ 16, 17 (1964).
18 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
19 Alfred University is a private institution with four colleges: the Liberal Arts
College, the School of Nursing, the Graduate School, and the New York State College of
Ceramics. The four students were enrolled in the Liberal Arts College, which was treated
as a private institution. Three other students were also involved in the demonstration,
but they were enrolled in the State College of Ceramics, which was treated as a public
institution. For information on the status of the State College of Ceramics as a "con-
tract college," see N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 350(3), 352(3), 355(1), 357 (McKinney 1969). See also
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 Initially, the students were brought before a faculty-student review board which
recommended that they be separated from the University. This was later modified by
the University President to the two-semester suspension. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73,
79 (2d Cir. 1968).
21 This section provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action autho-
rized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
COERCED TESTIMONY
In support of their contention that the disciplinary proceedings
involved state action, the students pointed out that New York regulates
educational standards in private colleges and universities.22 The court
replied that, in order for state action to be present,
the state must be involved not simply with some activity of the in-
stitution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with
the activity that caused the injury. . [T]he state action, not the
private action, must be the subject of complaint.23
Although seemingly persuasive, this argument is problematic. In
Cooper v. Aaron24 the Supreme Court was concerned with the actions
of state officials in Little Rock, Arkansas. After a troubled school year
following the Brown v. Board of Education25 decision, officials sus-
pended the city's desegregation plan for two and one-half years. In
22 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1969) (power of State Regents to make
rules in order to carry out educational policy of the state); id. § 214 (powers of Regents
extend over all secondary and higher educational institutions now in existence or to be
incorporated in the state); id. § 215 (power of Regents to require reports demonstrating
compliance with such rules); id. § 216 (power of Regents to regulate incorporation of edu-
cational institutions); id. § 305 (supervisory power of the Commissioner of Education).
23 407 F.2d at 81. This point was also made in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ.,
287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). There, students involved in disturbances at Columbia
University sought, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4) (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), to
enjoin university disciplinary proceedings. In alleging that federal jurisdiction was pre-
sent, the students argued that the University's connections with various agencies of the
federal government were sufficient to render the disciplinary proceedings state action.
The court, however, pointed out that in cases such as Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), "the critical 'involvement' was in the very 'discriminatory
action' under constitutional attack." 287 F. Supp. at 548, citing 365 U.S. at 724. The
Grossner court found no indication that the state was involved as a participant in the
disciplinary proceedings that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin, and therefore rejected this
basis for finding state action. For other arguments considered by the court, see notes 38
& 49 infra. Although New York had not acted in the field of college disciplinary proceed-
ings at the time of the Powe decision, it has since done so. In February 1969 the legis-
lature enacted a law requiring governing boards of colleges and universities to adopt rules
and regulations for the maintenance of public order on college property devoted to edu-
cational uses. Penalties for violations of these rules, which are to govern the conduct
of students, faculty, and other staff, are to be clearly set forth and are required to include
provisions for the suspension or expulsion of the faculty or student violator. Failure to file
such a scheme within 90 days of the passage of the law renders the college in question
ineligible for any state aid or assistance until the rules and regulations are filed. N.Y.
EDUC. LAw art. 129-A; Assembly Bill 6610-A. (Feb. 18, 1969). Since it is the college or
university that must promulgate and enforce the regulations, it is unclear whether
this legislation will justify a finding of state action in college disciplinary proceedings
under the requirement of direct involvement. However, the enactment of this law is a
significant step by the state toward regulation of disciplinary matters in both public and
private universities.
24 558 U.S. 1 (1958).
25 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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holding that the Negro children's rights could not be sacrificed because
of past violence,26 the Court declared that state responsibility under the
fourteenth amendment followed upon "support of segregated schools
through any arrangement, management, funds, or property .... ,,27
This point was reiterated in the more recent case of United States
v. Guest.28 Six defendants were indicted for criminally conspiring to
deprive Negroes of their right under the fourteenth amendment to
equal utilization of public facilities.29 The defendants argued that the
fourteenth amendment was inapplicable because the action in question
was purely private. The Court, however, found otherwise, and in so
doing addressed itself to the issue of direct and indirect state involve-
ment:
This is not to say .. . that the involvement of the State need
be either exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has
found state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the
Equal Protection Clause even though the participation of the State
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative
forces leading to the constitutional violation.30
Thus the Second Circuit's holding that mere regulation of educa-
tional standards is insufficient to justify a finding of state action is
questionable.31 Cooper and Guest indicate that the state need only be
indirectly involved with the private institution.3 2
26 358 U.S. at 16.
27 Id. at 19.
28 883 U.S. 745 (1966).
2D9 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Supp. IV, 1969) provided in re-
levant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his hav-
ing so exercised the same;
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747 (1966).
30 383 U.S. at 755-56.
31 While the requirement of direct involvement seems inconsistent with cases such
as Cooper, Guest and Burton, in which the state's participation has been indirect, it
should be pointed out that the argument that state regulation of educational standards
justifies a finding of state action has questionable ramifications. For example, the actions
of private industry have not been held subject to fourteenth amendment restrictions,
yet there is extensive government regulation in areas of private industry such as wages,
working hours, and safety standards. Government regulation extends to almost every
private activity in some form. Thus to argue that regulation of standards of education
justifies a finding of state action in university disciplinary proceedings may be to argue
that almost all forms of private activity are subject to the fourteenth amendment.
32 A more particular problem with the Second Circuit's narrow holding in Powe is
COERCED TESTIMONY
2. Direct Government Involvement with Private Institutions
In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of Louisiana,33
Tulane University refused to admit Negroes solely because of their
race. The district court considered three particular ties that the Uni-
versity had with the state: state officials were members of the Tulane
Board; state property had been transferred to the Board; and this
property, together with all immunities and powers granted, would
revert to the state if the Board did not fulfill its function of developing
and maintaining the University of Louisiana.34
The primary consideration was whether these connections were
such that the state exercised control over the Board. Since only three
raised by Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In that case California, in a referendum,
enacted a measure that nullified existing laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of private housing. The California court held the measure unconstitutional
as a denial of equal protection. In affirming, the Supreme Court adopted the state court's
conciusion that "a prohibited state involvement could be found 'even where the state
can be charged with only encouraging,' rather than commanding discrimination." Id. at 375.
The encouragement concept probably is not applicable to college disciplinary pro-
ceedings where the state merely regulates standards of education. Educational standards
are quite separate from the matter of discipline, and approval of one does not constitute
even tacit approval or encouragement of the other. The point at which there would be
state action, however, is not dear. It is impossible to define just how peripheral the state's
participation can be and still justify a holding that it has condoned or encouraged
some other aspect of the institution's behavior. For example, most private universities
receive financial aid from state governments. These contributions might be construed
as encouragement of all university policies, including disciplinary procedures. The courts,
however, have refused to find state action on the basis of financial contributions by the
government.
33 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), judgment vacated and new trial ordered, 207 F. Supp.
554 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674
(1962).
34 212 F. Supp. at 683-85. In 1882 Paul Tulane established a fund to promote higher
education. In 1884 the administrators of this fund took over the already existing University
of Louisiana and received all of its properties, powers, privileges, franchises, and im-
munities to develop and maintain the University of Louisiana. If they failed to do so,
all powers, privileges, property, and immunities would revert to the state. The University
was to be operated according to the terms of Paul Tulane's donation, and its name was
to be changed to Tulane University of Louisiana. The administrators of the Tulane Edu-
cational Fund remained a private corporation throughout these changes, and in the cir-
cumstances the court considered the use of the terms "public" and "private" an
oversimplification. 212 F. Supp. at 676-81. It therefore considered specific ties between the
University and the state.
In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, the court considered the exemption
of the Board's property and income from tax. The exemption had originally been granted
because the Board was fulfilling a public function, but by the time of the trial, the
exemption was a simple tax immunity comparable to that granted an orphanage in order
to foster charitable purposes. The court considered this to be a form of grant of state
funds to a private institution which, as it had held earlier, did not constitute state action
per se. Id. at 684-85.
1970]
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of seventeen members of the Board were state officials, and since these
three failed to attend meetings and disavowed any desire to influence
Board policy, the court held that their presence did not constitute state
action.35 The court also found that the amount of property transferred
to the University and subject to reversion was insufficient to justify a
finding of state action. 80
The matter of government financial involvement was also dealt
with in Powe v. Miles;37 there the amount of state and federal aid re-
ceived was even less than that involved in Guillory.88 It was thus clear
in both the Guillory and the Powe cases that government aid was not
so dominant as to constitute state action, but it may be impossible to
formulate a rule as to what percentage of a school's budget must come
from government in order to establish state action.39
35 Id. at 683.
86 Id. at 684. By the court's calculations, the value of property donated by the state
comprised approximately 12.6% of the book value and 7.7% of the estimated market value
of the Tulane Board's property. Id. With regard to the reversion of powers, the court
pointed out that the corporate charter to the Tulane Board gave it the power to operate
a university. Since the administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund were incorporated
for this purpose, a revocation by the state would in no way affect the operation of the
university. Id. at 685-86.
87 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
88 State and federal aid comprised approximately 3% of the total budget. Id. at 81.
One court has indicated that the amount of state and federal aid is immaterial if there
is no significant government involvement in another form. In Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), government funds amounted to ap-
proximately 44% of the University's total revenue in 1966-67; the court nevertheless held
that "receipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more, enough to make
the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the Government." Id. at 547-48.
The Grossner court also pointed out that even if the receipt of government funds
was enough to justify a finding that the University was an instrumentality of the govern-
ment, a distinction had to be drawn between funds received from the state government and
those received from the federal government. Here, 80% of the government funds re-
ceived by the University was from the federal government; the jurisdiction that plaintiffs
sought to invoke, however, required state, not federal, action. Thus the court, in dicta,
concluded that it could not have exercised jurisdiction regardless of the effect of receipt
of money from the state. In cases where governmental action complained of involves the
federal government, however, an allegation based upon the Bill of Rights rather than
the fourteenth amendment would be sufficient.
39 In holding that there was no state action, both the Powe and Guillory courts
considered two cases: Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore, 149 F.2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1945), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In the
Kerr case, a Negro was denied admission to the library's training program and brought
an action alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and of the Civil Rights Act. The most important factor in the court's determination that
the library was an agent of the state was the fact that recently approximately 99% of
the library's income was received from and disbursed by the city. 149 F.2d at 216.
In the Burton case, the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of
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3. Education as a Public Function
The third argument advanced for finding state action in private
university activities is that education is a public function. This argu-
ment was well stated by Judge Skelley Wright in the first trial of Guil-
lory v. Administators of Tulane University of Louisiana,40 where he
suggested that Brown v. Board of Education41 and other Supreme Court
decisions42 have recognized education, whether by public or private in-
stitutions, as a matter of great public importance. 43 The administrators
of private universities are therefore performing a public function, and
since they do the work of the state, they are subject to the same re-
straints of the fourteenth amendment as is the state itself.
44
This argument was considered in Powe v. Miles.45 The court there
pointed out that where a private entity's public function has been
considered state action, the property in question has been put to public
Delaware, owned and operated an off-street parking building. The Authority leased space
to the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc. for use as a restaurant, in which a Negro was subse-
quently refused service. The Court held state action to be present, but only because the
state had placed its prestige, power, and property behind the discrimination. 365 U.S. at 725.
The government's financial involvement, on the other hand, was found to be persuasive
against a finding of state action. Id. at 723. There were two relevant figures: only 15%
of the total cost of construction was paid from public funds, and anticipated revenue
from parking (the only public activity associated with the building) was only 30% of
the total expected income. Id. at 722-23.
The Burton majority indicated the difficulty of attempting to formulate a broad rule
by cautioning that the holding in that case was of limited applicability even in the area
of government leasing agreements:
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the conclusions
drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are by no means declared
as universal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be
tested.
Id. at 725.
40 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La. 1962).
41 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
43 The importance of education at the university level has also been recognized. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has pointed to "[t]he need for higher education and the duty of the
state to provide it as part of ... the democratic faith of most of our states." West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
44 Private groups performing public functions have been held subject to the four-
teenth amendment. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (picketing in public parking lot of shopping center protected by first
amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private political party primary could
not deny Negroes their fifteenth amendment right to participate in the electoral process);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (corporation owning company town could not
curtail exercise of constitutional rights on town sidewalk because of its public nature).
45 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968).
1970]
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use; the owner, therefore, could not exclude members of the public
who wished to exercise their constitutional rights in a manner con-
sistent with the public character of the property. On this ground the
court distinguished the Alfred University football field; it was open
only to persons connected with the University or licensed by it to
participate in or attend events held there.46
This is not, however, a satisfactory answer to Judge Wright's argu-
ment. Conceding that the Alfred football field has not been dedicated
to a public use, it is education, and not the football field, that, as a
public function, constitutes a source of state action.
The Powe court rebutted another line of authority establishing
state action where the activities of private groups, such as private politi-
cal dubs holding primary elections, were essentially governmental in
nature.47 The court pointed out that this was not true of education,
that the field of education has never been a government monopoly in
the same sense as are elections.48 The situation of the university was
therefore held to be distinguishable.
Education may not be a governmental activity in the same sense
as are elections, but it is an activity affected with a great deal of public
interest. That it has not been a government monopoly does not pre-
dude 'its being subject to the fourteenth amendment; the activities
considered in several landmark state action cases could not be char-
acterized as government monopolies, yet state action was found.49
However, it remains unclear whether courts will consider dis-
ciplinary sanctions by private universities state action. The degree to
which the government must be involved with the private institution in
question has not been established, nor is it clear whether the require-
46 Id.
47 Id. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (maintenance of park by a private
association held to be state action).
48 407 F.2d at 80.
49 Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
The argument that education is a public function was also considered and rejected
in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 546-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (see
notes 23 & 38 supra). The court argued that cases such as Marsh dealt only with property
used by the public in general, and that those such as Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953),
applied only to functions governmental in character. 287 F. Supp. at 549. The disciplinary
action taken by Columbia University was held to be outside both classes of cases. Id. See
also the treatment given these arguments in the second Guillory trial, wherein the court
held that activities derived their constitutional character from their source of power and
control. 212 F. Supp. at 683.
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ment that the state be directly involved with the injurious activity is
valid. In addition, Judge Wright's argument that education is a public
function has not received adequate treatment. The difficulty of apply-
ing the state action concept makes it necessary to consider an alternative
approach to the problem of the admissibility of testimony coerced by
a private college or university.0
II
RE-EXAMINATION OF CRITERIA FOR ADMISSIBILITY
OF COERCED STATEMENTS
In Furutani v. Ewigleben5' the district court considered students'
rights in terms of the concept of state action. Arguably, this issue need
not have been reached since there is a more basic question of the ad-
missibility of any coerced testimony. Resolution of this issue makes
it unnecessary to consider whether the disciplinary activities of private
universities are subject to the fourteenth amendment.
Although recent decisions have been concerned primarily with the
constitutional problems posed by coerced confessions,5 2 the inherent
unreliability53 of these statements has continued to be recognized as an
important factor.54 The nature of the problem is explained well by
Professor Wigmore:
[E]nough [untrue confessions] have been verified to fortify the con-
clusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct, that
under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality
or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This pos-
possibility arises wherever the innocent person is placed in such a
situation that the untrue acknowledgement of guilt is at the time
50 The uncertainty in the state action approach is further demonstrated by an issue
raised in the Powe case. There, the Second Circuit stated that "[w]hether this [holding
that there is no basis for a finding of state action] would be true if Alfred were to adopt
discriminatory admission policies... is a different question we need not here decide." 407
F.2d at 81 (citations omitted). In the court's view, whether state action is present depends
not only on the amount and placement of aid from the government, but also on what
constitutional rights are involved. It is questionable whether this position reflects equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment.
51 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
52 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963); Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1954); 2 B. JoNEs, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, CIvIL AND CRIMINAL § 400
(5th ed. 1958); RIacARDSON, EVIIDENCE § 340 (9th ed. 1964); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822
(3d ed. 1940).
54 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
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the more promising of two alternatives between which he is obliged
to choose; that is, he chooses any risk that may be in falsely acknowl-
edging guilt, in preference to some worse alternative associated
with silence.55
It thus appears that statements are equally unreliable whether they
are coerced by public officials or by private individuals. The important
point is not that coercion was effected by a police officer rather than
by a private university; it is that coercion was present. 58 In both cases
the element of coercion renders the admission obtained unreliable.
It should therefore be inadmissible.
In addition, admitting coerced statements into evidence deprives
the accused of his due process right to a fair trial. In Brown v. Miss-
issippi57 the Supreme Court reversed murder convictions based upon
confessions obtained through physical torture. Justice Hughes, speak-
ing for the Court, emphasized that the use of these confessions as the
basis for conviction was a denial of due process because it denied the
defendants their right to a fair trial.58
55 WIGMoRE, supra note 53. Although Wigmore was concerned in the quoted passage
only with confessions, it is clear that this category includes the kind of testimony under
consideration here. A confession is defined as "an acknowledgment in express words, by the
accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential
part of it." Id. § 821 (emphasis in original). In addition, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that the considerations of reliability relevant in the field of confessions are also
applicable to admissions. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963); Opper
v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1954).
56 With regard to reliability, coerced statements differ from evidence obtained in an
illegal search or seizure. The latter is reliable and is admissible when obtained by a pri-
vate person. People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968)
and cases cited therein at 22 N.Y.2d 382. The distinction between evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure by a public official and that similarly obtained by a
private individual is based on the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule in such situa-
tions: to deter public officials from illegal searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). This deterrence argument is not relevant in the case of private individuals, how-
ever, because they are not primarily interested in obtaining convictions.
The deterrence policy is also present with regard to statements coerced by public
officials. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Because it would not apply to coercion by
private individuals, it might be argued by analogy to illegal search and seizure evidence
that statements coerced by private individuals should be admissible. In the case of
coerced statements, however, the accused's right to a fair trial is impaired if any coerced
statements are admitted. (Pages 447-48 infra) Thus statements coerced by a private in-
dividual are to be treated differently from evidence obtained by a private individual in
an illegal search or seizure.
57 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
58 Id. at 285-86. Although the Brown court dealt only with confessions, the more
recent, broader holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), indicates that the
constitutional considerations that apply to confessions also apply to admissions. Speaking
COERCED TESTIMONY
While the Brown case involved coercion by state officials, recent
decisions indicate that the considerations deemed important there are
also controlling in the situation in which statements are coerced by
private individuals. In People v. Frank59 a New York court considered
the admissibility of statements made to department store security guards
by an employee suspected of theft. The test held to govern admissibility
was whether the admissions were made voluniarily; no distinction was
drawn between admissions made to private individuals and those made
to public officials.60 In either case, a preliminary hearing on the issue of
voluntariness was necessary. 61
The policies behind this decision were well articulated in People
v. Berve6 2 wherein a confession had been coerced by threatened mob
violence. In holding the confession inadmissible,6 the California Su-
preme Court pointed out that
[n]o valid grounds for distinction are to be found in the fact
that the coercion in this case was inflicted by civilians, and not the
police... . The prohibition which bars the use of involuntary
confessions is not only designed as a regulation of the conduct of
police officers, but also to insure that an accused's right to a fair
trial is protected.... The absence of volition condemns an en-
forced confession. Due process requires that it be given voluntarily
and without promise of immunity or reward.64
Thus admission of any coerced statement denies the accused his
right to a fair trial. It is irrelevant that the statements are coerced by
private individuals rather than by public officials; in either case, admis-
sion of the statement constitutes a denial of due process. This rule is
applicable to admissions coerced by a private university and sought to
be introduced in a subsequent criminal proceeding. A finding of state
for the Court in Miranda, Justice Warren stated that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 444.
69 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
60 Id. at 267. That this is the law in New York is clear from People v. Harden, 17
N.Y.2d 470, 214 N.E.2d 159, 266 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1965). The decisions of four other juris-
dictions are in accord with this holding- People v. Berve, 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97
(1958) (confession coerced by mob violence); Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12 So. 2d 168
(1943) (dicta); Agee v. State, 185 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1966) (defendant's confession induced
by former professor's offer of leniency); Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P.2d 500
(1967) (admissions of repairman to supervisors held voluntary and thus admissible).
61 52 Misc. 2d at 268, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
62 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97 (1958).
63 Id. at 293, 332 P.2d at 101.
64 Id. (citations omitted).
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action on the part of the university is unnecessary, since it is the court
that has the power to admit the statements and, by so doing, to deny
the student his right to a fair trial.6 5
Douglas Meiklejohn
65 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), makes dear that actions of state courts are
subject to constitutional restrictions. In holding that judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Justice Vinson made it clear that an act of the state judiciary is state action
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment:
In numerous cases, this Court has reversed criminal convictions in state courts
for failure of those courts to provide the essential ingredients of a fair hearing.
Thus it has been held that convictions obtained in state courts under the domina-
tion of a mob are void .... Convictions obtained by coerced confessions, by the
use of perjured testimony known by the prosecution to be such, or without the
effective assistance of counsel, have also been held to be exertions of state authority
in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 16-17 (citations and footnotes omitted).
